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Abstract 
 
According to the standard analysis of commodity prices, stockpiling is a 
necessary signature of speculation. This paper develops an approach 
suggesting that speculation may temporarily push crude oil prices above the 
level justified by physical-market fundamentals, without necessarily resulting in 
a significant increase in oil inventories. Looking beyond debate on the value of 
oil-demand price-elasticity, showing a demand curve makes sense only if we 
consider a fixed time horizon (e.g. short-run). The scenario of oil demand 
slowly but continuously adjusting to a price fuelled by speculation implies that 
price elasticity of demand is an increasing function of the time horizon 
considered. Short- and long-run elasticities can then be used to calibrate this 
function. A very low very-short-run price elasticity suggests that an 
exogenously-driven rise in crude oil price has a very slight impact on demand in 
the very short run and therefore, with supply constant, leads to a minimal 
increase in inventories. This interpretation differs from the traditional view, 
according to which storage of just a few barrels is enough to raise prices when 
elasticity is very low. We present several analytical and numerical illustrations 
(with oil-demand adjustment following Gompertz, logistic and exponential 
paths). The role that speculation may have played in recent movements in oil 
prices is also discussed. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We put forward a simple but, as far as we know, original approach that suggests speculation 
may (at least temporarily) push the price of physical oil above the level justified by 
fundamentals, without necessarily resulting in significantly higher stocks. 
Recent changes in crude oil prices are behind controversies over the role of the financial 
markets and speculation. Many analysts have, for example, blamed speculative positions on 
futures markets for triggering the rise in crude oil prices in 2008. Various economists (e.g. 
Krugman (2008), Smith (2009)) have objected that physical stockpiling is a necessary 
signature of speculation, whereas speculation has sometimes been blamed even without any 
increase in oil stocks. In their opinion, in the absence of any accumulation of stocks, 
speculative flows on futures markets cannot have any effect on physical markets. 
When the speculative increase is triggered by futures markets, a traditional justification for 
this assumes that spot and derivatives markets are in equilibrium. Taking this financial 
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viewpoint, spot and futures prices must be connected by an arbitrage-free relationship. A rise 
in futures prices that is speculative in origin can then be transmitted to spot prices via cash-
and-carry arbitrage. This trading, which causes stockpiling, raises the spot price until the no-
arbitrage equilibrium is redressed. 
Another more general justification works on the assumption of economic equilibrium, stating 
that oil is a consumer good whose (fundamental) price is set where supply meets demand. 
From this perspective, a price of physical oil driven by speculation above the level 
corresponding to the physical-market fundamentals necessarily implies the accumulation of a 
stock (i.e., an increase in inventories). This economic viewpoint, which encompasses the 
financial one, emphasises the behaviour of demand over that of arbitragers. Put simply, 
instead of believing that oil stockpiling raises the oil price, it holds that a crude-oil price 
increase leads to a reduction in demand and therefore results in the non-consumed portion of 
supply being stored. In this paper, we favour this (more general) economic approach which 
does not require specific assumptions about the origin and destination of accumulated stocks. 
Some authors have already taken the view that speculation may affect the spot price without 
any increase in stocks transpiring. Parsons (2009) considers the case where producers, 
noticing that futures prices are higher than spot prices, do not increase their production when 
they have the possibility of doing so. This constitutes ground storage. However, in the first 
half of 2008, OPEC spare capacity reached a trough, making it unlikely that they were then 
building up inventories under the ground. Moreover, according to Smith (2009), "non-OPEC 
producers responded to rising prices by pushing output further up a receding supply curve – 
not by shutting in reserves". Saporta et al. (2009) cite the possible behaviour of consumers or 
industrial operators who dip into their inventories to delay purchases if they feel the price 
increase will be temporary. The corresponding reduction in these stocks may mask 
speculative stockpiling. To find empirical evidence of this is difficult. 
The approach we are developing is different and is based on world's oil demand slowly but 
steadily adjusting to an exogenously-driven change in crude oil price. Our approach leads to 
derive the price elasticity of demand as a continuous function of the time horizon (i.e., length 
of run) considered. If, as a result of speculation, the crude oil price climbs above the level 
corresponding to the physical-market fundamentals, global oil demand will adjust to this new 
price only gradually, falling a little more each day. Symmetrically, the increase in worldwide 
stocks – slight at first – will be a little greater each day. Consequently, if after a relatively 
short time the price returns to that justified by fundamentals, only a very modest increase in 
stocks will have been observed. In other words, stockpiling will not have been a “legible” 
signature of speculation. In this respect, our approach may be interpreted as an attempt to 
reconcile the various points of view regarding the role played by speculation. 
In the first section, we describe the viewpoint of analysts who consider that positions held by 
investors on derivatives markets were decisive in explaining the oil-price hike in 2008. In the 
second section, we present the economic analysis that implies stockpiling is a necessary 
hallmark of speculation. In the third section, we present our approach and provide numerical 
illustrations. The final section concludes. 
 
 
1. A possible scenario of the role played by speculation in 2007-2008 
 
In 2006, a number of politicians and financial analysts started to attribute the rise in oil prices 
to speculation rather than changes in market fundamentals. The magnitude of the increase in 
2008, which preceded an equally spectacular fall in prices, led to many observers adopting 
this stance, believing that the developments in 2008 were largely due to the positions taken by 
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investors (pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, investment banks and others) on 
futures markets.  
Most analyses that highlight the role of speculation are based on the observation that this rise 
in crude oil prices coincided with a general increase in commodity prices. For example, the 
S&P GSCI Spot index gained 85% between July 2007 and July 2008. Very basically, a 
common explanation is that the rise in commodity prices as a whole largely originated in the 
sub-prime crisis, which began in July 2007 in the United States. Investors were then expecting 
the dollar to depreciate and inflation to rise (involving a fall in interest rates and an injection 
of liquidity into the banking system). To hedge against these two risks, investors bought huge 
amounts of commodity futures contracts. Indeed, for a few years now there has been a 
negative correlation3 between oil prices and the value of the dollar. Several explanations for 
this relationship have been put forward. Crude oil prices are quoted in dollars. In contrast, 
consumers react to prices expressed in their local currency, meaning that a depreciation of the 
dollar makes oil cheaper in local currency. This brings additional demand that pushes prices 
up. Note that this causation can work in the opposite direction: for example, a rise in oil prices 
widens the US trade deficit, weakening the dollar. Other possible motivations for these 
purchases of futures contracts have also been put forward: wish to diversify portfolios of 
assets whose value is only partially correlated with commodity prices (for many analysts oil 
has emerged as a new financial asset class), intention to speculate on Chinese economic 
growth, etc. These purchases result in a substantial increase in the number of open positions 
held by "non-commercials" on the NYMEX oil futures market. In other words, commodity 
futures markets benefit4 from the transfer of liquidity away from financial assets denominated 
in dollars. In July 2008, the sub-prime crisis proved more serious than expected and, above 
all, revealed itself to be global. Investors were faced with a risk of deflation (linked to the 
imminent recession) and a strengthening of the dollar (owing to risk aversion among investors 
who, amidst a worldwide recession, withdrew to dollar-denominated assets). Furthermore, a 
shift in market fundamentals, linked to the recession, took place. Confronted by a complete 
change in inflation- and dollar-related risks, investors closed their positions en masse, leading 
to a fall in commodity prices (the S&P GSCI Spot lost 65% between July 2008 and January 
2009) and causing the market to revert back to its new fundamentals. 
According to proponents of this view, the "bubble" was mainly a reflection of rational 
behaviour (portfolio diversification and risk hedging) and the surge in futures prices up to 
mid-2008 naturally filtered through to the price of physical oil, as the majority of commercial 
transactions resulting in physical delivery actually depends on forward or futures prices. Note 
that under some theoretical assumptions - markets are in equilibrium and the interest rate is 
constant - prices of futures and forward contracts are the same (Schwartz (1997)). Getting oil 
through physical settlement of a forward contract – as this occurs in practice - then means 
paying this oil at a futures price. Besides, when - for instance - an airline buys futures 
contracts to lock in the price of the fuel it will use in the future, it will eventually have paid 
this fuel at a futures price (even if these futures contracts are cash-settled and physical fuel is 
finally bought on the spot market). This realization, which relegates spot markets to the rank 
of micro-markets, goes well beyond the example often cited in the literature (e.g. Fattouh 
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(2007)), of the national companies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran using futures prices5 of 
Brent quoted on the ICE (London) for sales to Europe. Changes in futures prices would 
therefore “spontaneously” reflect in the price of physical oil. 
Various econometric studies have used available data to estimate the role of speculation in the 
crude oil futures markets. It is hard to draw any obvious conclusions from this research. For 
example, Büyüksahin and Harris (2009) used data from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC). Their work finds “little evidence that hedge funds and other non-
commercial (speculator) positions changes Granger-cause price changes”. Their “results 
instead suggest that price changes do precede their position changes”. In contrast, Möbert 
(2009) of Deutsche Bank reaches the opposite conclusion: speculation, or more specifically 
"speculators’ dispersion in beliefs”, influences both oil price and its volatility. Chevalier et al. 
(2010) provide a recent survey of these econometric studies. Lastly, it is worth noting that a 
study based on statistical physics and the theory of complexity (Sornette et al. (2009)) 
concludes with the existence of a speculative bubble on oil price in 2008. 
 
 
2. Stockpiling: a necessary signature of speculation? 
 
The arguments traditionally put forward as evidence that a price increase of speculative origin 
must lead to an increase in inventories are based on the need for a financial equilibrium (non-
arbitrage relationship between spot price and futures prices) or an economic equilibrium 
(balance between oil supply and demand). We present both viewpoints, arguing that here the 
wider economic perspective seems more appropriate. 
On the futures markets there is undeniably a financial equilibrium6, characterised by an 
absence of arbitrage opportunities, which limits the difference between spot and futures prices 
to just a few dollars. From this financial perspective, a speculation-driven increase in futures 
prices may spread to the price of physical oil via cash-and-carry type arbitrages, which 
involve buying oil on the spot market and simultaneously reselling it on the futures market, 
storing it until the futures contract expires. In reality, this arbitrage, which leads to 
stockpiling, may – usually at least – play only a relatively marginal role in determining prices. 
In addition to the previous argument that changes in futures prices would “spontaneously” 
reflect in the price of physical oil, we could make an analogy with the theory of contestable 
markets: commercial transactions are carried out directly on the basis of a smooth forward 
price curve, with futures prices forming a dominant psychological reference in traders’ 
behaviour. Put simply, nobody would think of conducting a physical transaction at a price 
disconnected from the futures price. By this rationale, cash-and-carry arbitrage would play 
only a secondary role in the determination of the forward curve (of which the spot price 
would just be an extremity). This argument is implicitly used by certain analysts who point 
the finger at speculation. 
However, oil is a consumer good whose price, at economic equilibrium, is set where physical 
supply meets demand. As a result, and as many economists including Paul Krugman7 (2008) 
have stressed, if speculation causes the price to rise above that corresponding to physical-
market fundamentals, physical stockpiling must occur. In other words, world consumers are 
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(1997)). 
7 Nobel Prize for Economics 2008. 
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unwilling to purchase all oil produced at a price determined exogenously by speculators. As 
Paul Krugman highlights, if financial speculators managed – one way or another – to increase 
the price of petrol, this would have repercussions on the material world: "faced with higher 
prices, drivers would cut back on their driving; homeowners would turn down their 
thermostats; owners of marginal wells would put them back into production". The balance 
between supply and demand would thus be broken, leading to a downward readjustment of 
price unless someone stores the excess supply. This stock then acts as an adjustment variable, 
allowing the financial equilibrium (non-arbitrage relationship between spot and futures prices) 
and economic equilibrium (where global demand for oil meets supply). 
Figure 1 illustrates such a situation: if, due to the financial equilibrium, the futures price 
pushes the spot price above that justified by physical-market fundamentals, a stock will 
accumulate (guaranteeing the economic equilibrium). The greater the price elasticity of 
demand (i.e. the flatter the slope of the demand curve in Figure 1), the greater the quantity of 
the stock. As Krugman states (2008), although the elasticity of global oil demand to crude-oil 
price is low in the short run, it is not zero. If we take this short-run elasticity to be around -5% 
(e.g. Cooper (2003), Hamilton (2009)), a speculative increase in crude oil price of around 
20% would require 1% of global production to be stored. 
There would also have to be a continued and not just temporary increase in inventories for the 
price of physical oil to remain above the level justified by market fundamentals. According to 
many economists, without stockpiling, speculation cannot affect physical markets even if this 
has been blamed repeatedly in recent years (without there necessarily being any increase in 
stocks). 
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Figure 1: storage, variable of adjustment between financial and economic equilibriums 
 
 
In conclusion, a parallel movement in futures and spot prices may simply reflect a change in 
market fundamentals. Due to the liquidity and efficiency of futures markets, the deviation in 
the futures price may even precede that of the spot price. In contrast, a speculative (i.e., 
disconnected from the fundamentals) increase in futures prices can affect the price of physical 
oil only via storage. 
 
Figure 2 plots the WTI spot price as a function of OECD industry petroleum and crude oil 
stocks (adjusted for variations in floating stocks and expressed in days of OECD demand). 
This figure is similar to Pirrong's (2008) Figure 1 which shows the relationship between oil 
price and U.S. crude oil inventories. Both figures lead to the same observation: the historical 
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downward-sloping price-inventory relationship8 seems to vanish after 2003. From 2004 on, 
during certain periods, points go in the opposite direction, such that higher inventories may be 
associated with higher prices. To draw definite conclusions is however difficult. It should first 
be noted that data on inventories are not comprehensive and sometimes differ between 
agencies. Moreover, stockpiling as a signature should be assessed on a world basis, and not at 
the OECD scale only. In addition, until 2008, this shift in price-inventory relationships could 
be interpreted as the industry's response to the decrease in OPEC spare capacity (i.e., a shift of 
stock risk management down the crude supply chain to refiners). Krugman (2009) wrote in 
July 2009: "last year I was skeptical about claims that speculation was central to the price 
rise", "this time, however, oil inventories are bulging ... the signature of large-scale 
speculation is clearly visible". 
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Figure 2: WTI spot price (in nominal dollars) versus OECD industry total stocks adjusted for 
variations in floating stocks (expressed in days of OECD demand) from 1991Q1 to 2009Q4 
(quarterly data downloaded from IEA on 3/10/2010). 
 
 
3. Proposed approach based on a gradual adaptation of demand 
 
The price elasticity of demand measures the relative change in demand caused by a relative 
change in price. Usually, the economic literature distinguishes between short-run price 
elasticity, which is more directly observable, and long-run price elasticity. The short-run 
elasticity of oil demand to crude oil price is relatively low. Explanations include not just the 
difficulty in substituting petroleum products in the transport sector but also the fact that, in 
many countries, the price signal is hidden by subsidies or by fuel taxes that are independent of 
crude oil prices. In terms of absolute value, long-run elasticity is higher as it takes into 
account longer-term effects linked in particular to changes in vehicle fleets (replacement of 
old vehicles with more fuel-efficient models) as well as residential and industrial equipment. 
                                                     
8 This downward-sloping price-inventory relationship is in line with the standard financial view in futures-
pricing models: for instance, Schwartz (1997) writes in his footnote 4: " The positive correlation between 
changes in the spot price and changes in the convenience yield of the commodity is induced by the level of 
inventories. When inventories of the commodity decrease, the spot price should increase since the commodity is 
scarce ... , and vice versa when inventories increase." 
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As Smith (2009) highlights, "empirical estimates of price elasticity of demand for crude oil 
vary by place, time, and statistical techniques". Estimates and surveys drawn up by Dahl 
(1993), Cooper (2003) and Hamilton (2009) assess the price elasticity of demand for crude oil 
at between -0.2 and -0.3 in the long run and less than -0.1 in the short run. According to Smith 
(2009), "estimates of -0.05 (short-run) and -0.30 (long-run) are typical, with several years 
required to complete the adjustment to a permanent price change". 
Leaving aside debate on the accurate values of these elasticities, we shall consider their 
interpretation in a dynamic context. To do this, let us assume that the price of physical oil, 
equal to P, is initially in line with market fundamentals, with a corresponding global oil 
demand equal to 0q . Let us assume that on date 0t =  an activity of speculative origin 
suddenly increases this price by PΔ , even though physical-market fundamentals remain 
unchanged. The price is supposed to remain indefinitely at its new speculative value P P+ Δ . 
( )q t  denotes global oil demand on t. 
The long-run price elasticity, denoted lε , allows us to determine the level of oil demand 
perfectly suited to this new price. We shall call this theoretical demand "fully-adjusted 
demand" and refer to it as lq . We have: 0
0
l
l
q q P
q P
ε− Δ = , which gives: 
    0 1l l
pq q
p
ε⎛ ⎞Δ= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                      (1)
  
As Dargay and Gately (2009) write, "oil consumption does not respond instantaneously to 
changes in price and income (GDP), but instead changes slowly over time as the capital 
equipment adjusts". In theory, on an infinite horizon demand should therefore asymptotically 
tend towards fully-adjusted demand: 
( )lim lt q t q→∞ =           (2) 
The interpretation of the short-run price elasticity, denoted sε , first requires us to explain 
what we mean by short-run. When statistical analysis is done on real data, the short run is 
generally the periodicity of the data. Most econometric estimates of the price elasticity of oil 
demand are based on the use of annual data (e.g., Cooper (2003), Gately and Huntington 
(2002), IEA (2006), Dargay and Gately (2009)), the short run then being a year. Let us go 
back to the example of a sudden but permanent change in the oil price. Short-run elasticity 
then shows the change in demand observed over the first year, as an annual average. This 
gives us: 
( )1 0
0
1 s
pq s ds q
p
ε⎛ ⎞Δ= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫         (3) 
 
For Paul Krugman, attributing a price increase to speculation in cases where there is no oil 
stockpiling is to deny the existence of a demand curve. But in the same way that short-run 
elasticity is lower than long-run elasticity, it seems plausible that very-short-run elasticity is 
much lower than short-run elasticity due to various rigidities: price inertia of refined products, 
habits, scheduled trips, etc. This is also consistent with the observation that very-short-run 
price volatility has little impact on oil demand. 
In summary, changes in global oil demand are only partially represented by short- and long-
run elasticities. In reality, demand adjusts to the new price only gradually, falling each day. 
As a result, in addition to (2) and (3), function q should theoretically meet the following two 
conditions:  
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 ( ) 00q q=            (4) 
( ) 0dq t
dt
≤  for all t                     (5) 
(4) reflects the fact that consumers need at least some time to respond. As we will see, this 
absence of an instant reaction is consistent with the view of a demand that is virtually inelastic 
when the time horizon under consideration is infinitesimal. (5) requires demand to be a 
decreasing function of time, with consumption’s adjustment to the new price being seen as 
irreversible. 
By analogy with certain diffusion processes, we can imagine an adjustment of demand 
following an S-shaped curve like that in figure 3. The hatched area corresponds to the 
satisfaction of condition (3). 
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Figure 3: gradual adjustment of demand to a price that is PΔ  higher than the price P 
corresponding to market fundamentals. 
 
Due to the gradual reduction in demand, it is as if the elasticity observed depends on the time 
horizon considered, with elasticity increasing the further the horizon in question. Let us define 
( )tε  as the elasticity given by the reduction in demand observed between dates 0 and t: 
( )
( ) 0
0
0
t
q s ds tq
Pt
tq p
ε
−
= Δ
∫
        (6) 
 
According to (2) and (3), we have ( )lim lt tε ε→∞ =  and ( )1 sε ε=  respectively. In addition, since 
by first-order Taylor expansion ( ) ( )
0
t
q s ds tq t≈∫  for a small t, by using (4) we also have 
( )
0
lim 0
t
tε→ = . 
Furthermore (and more importantly), (5) implies that the absolute value of elasticity ε  is an 
increasing9 function of the time horizon (i.e., length of run) considered: ( ) ( ) 0d t
dt
ε− ≥  for all t. 
                                                     
9 We here formalize an old line of thought: Friedman (1962) states that "in the shortest of all runs, where 
conditions are allowed to vary very little, one would expect the demand curve to have the least elasticity. As the 
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With supply (production) unchanged, that which is not consumed is, by definition, stored. The 
average volume of oil stocks accumulated during the period [ ]0, t  is: 
( )
( )0 0 0
t
tq q s ds
Pt q
t P
ε
− Δ= −
∫
                              (7) 
As a result, and with ( )tε−  being an increasing function of time, stockpiling will only be a 
visible hallmark of speculation if the latter keeps the oil price above the level justified by the 
physical-market fundamentals for long enough. 
For the sake of illustration, Figure 4 shows the change in world oil demand calibrated 
according to a Gompertz curve, considering the price-elasticity of oil demand measured in 
annual data to be equal to -0.05 ( )sε=  in the short run and -0.21 ( )lε=  in the long run (see 
Hamilton (2009)). We assume that on date 0 the price rises to (and then remains at) a level 
20% P
P
Δ⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  greater than that justified by market fundamentals, with the corresponding 
initial demand 0q  being 31.2 billion barrels per year (i.e., 85.48 million barrels per day). 
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Figure 4: adjustment of demand to a price 20% higher than that justified by market 
fundamentals, according to a Gompertz curve. 
 
If supply is unchanged, the difference between the new demand and initial demand must be 
stored. The curve in Figure 5 shows the elasticity and average daily increase in oil stocks, 
depending on the time horizon used. A single curve is enough to represent these two values 
which remain proportional according to (7). The average daily increase in stocks is just 
0.17 million barrels during the first quarter, whereas it is 0.85 million barrels during the first 
year. Consequently, if after three months the price returns to the level corresponding to the 
physical-market fundamentals, only a very modest increase in stocks will have been observed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
range of conditions which are allowed to vary is widened, one would expect the elasticity of the demand curve to 
increase". 
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Figure 5: Average daily stock increase and corresponding elasticity, with respect to time 
horizon 
 
The approach developed in this paper leads us to calculate a price-elasticity dependent on 
time – according to (6) – considering the reaction of demand to a change in price to be a 
gradual and continuous process over time. When this demand reaction follows - for instance - 
a logistic or exponential path, this elasticity can be determined analytically. The appendix 
deals with this point and provides other numerical illustrations. 
In the previous analysis, we implicitly considered that the fully-adjusted demand curve, 
characterised by the long-run price elasticity of demand, did not move over time. Value lq  
corresponding to the speculative price was therefore considered to be constant. However, the 
fully-adjusted demand curve can move over time, for example as a result of changes in 
income (GDP). From this perspective, the change in demand is a complex process with the 
variation in demand qΔ  observed over time period tΔ  broadly obeying the following 
equation: 
l
l
q qq t q
t q
δ δ
δ δΔ = Δ + Δ         (8) 
Term q t
t
δ
δ Δ  represents the effect of demand adjusting towards lq , term ll
q q
q
δ
δ Δ  represents 
the effect of the variation in lq . In the previous analysis, only the process by which demand 
evolves towards its value fully adjusted to the new price had been considered, implicitly 
assuming 0lqΔ = . 
Illustrating a more complex situation, let us assume that in time t speculation suddenly pushes 
the crude oil price above the level justified by fundamentals, and that the price remains at this 
new level. In addition, let us assume that GDP growth gradually shifts the fully-adjusted 
demand curve to the right. As a result, during the time interval [ ],t t t+ Δ , the oil demand starts 
a process of adjusting to the higher new price: 0q
t
δ
δ ≤ . By shifting the fully-adjusted demand 
curve to the right, the increase in GDP during [ ],t t t+ Δ  implies 0lqΔ ≥ . As in theory demand 
can only be an increasing function of its fully-adjusted value (i.e., 0
l
q
q
δ
δ ≥ ), terms 
q t
t
δ
δ Δ  and 
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l
l
q q
q
δ
δ Δ  of the right-hand side of (8) have opposite signs. Put simply, the gradual adjustment 
of demand to the new price is partially neutralised by GDP growth, which reduces the volume 
of stocks accumulated. When the price corresponding to fundamentals catches up with the 
actual price, the signature of speculation will ultimately have been hardly visible. 
Note that this dynamic view remains formally consistent with the equilibriums in Figure 1. 
All the time, whatever the forces – speculation or fundamental factors - driving the physical-
oil market price, the oil supply is equal to the oil demand plus the variation in inventories. 
Here, inventories have a passive role, in the sense that they merely serve as an adjustment 
variable between demand and supply.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the financial and economic equilibriums discussed in Section 2 are 
entirely compatible. However, we have favoured the economic approach as it does not require 
specific assumptions about the origin and destination of accumulated stocks. Whether or not 
the futures price curve necessitates arbitrage trades is ultimately not the key issue. What is 
important is that a speculative rise in the price of physical oil – disconnected from market 
fundamentals – causes an imbalance between supply and demand, which must be offset by an 
increase in inventories. When considering the variation in stocks to simply be the difference 
between supply and demand, placing the emphasis on the behaviour of demand, rather than of 
stocks, seems more appropriate. 
The demand curve – as represented in Figure 1 – thus plays a key role in the standard 
economic analysis of the formation of oil prices. However, this graphic representation of a 
demand curve only makes sense if we consider a given time horizon (corresponding to the 
short run, for example). In other words, there is probably no immediately observable “static” 
demand curve. Indeed, demand adjusts gradually, not immediately, to changes in oil prices. 
We can even imagine that over an infinitesimal time period demand is totally inelastic. The 
scenario of oil demand gradually adjusting to a speculative price leads us to define price-
elasticity as an increasing function of the time horizon considered. Short- and long-run 
elasticities can then be used to calibrate this function. 
The traditional argument of a self-fulfilling bubble is often presented as: "when anticipating a 
price increase, storing a few barrels is enough to raise oil prices when short-run elasticity is 
small". Adopting our approach, in the very short run the argument could be: an (exogenous) 
rise in oil price reduces demand only slightly and therefore results in a negligible stocking. 
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Appendix: analytical expression of elasticity for certain demand-reaction functions 
 
The Gompertz curve in Figure 4 has the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
0 0
1
1
bta e
l a
eq t q q q
e
−− −= − − −  
with parameters: 0 31.2q = , 29.89lq = , 2.54a = , 1.436b = . 
A simple analytical expression of the elasticity corresponding to this reaction function of 
demand does not exist (the curve in Figure 5 is obtained through numerical simulation).  
Let us now assume that the reaction of demand can be modelled as follows: 
( ) ( )0 0 11
rt
l rt
eq t q q q
ce
−
−
−= − − +          (9) 
where c and r are given parameters. 
(9), which describes an adjustment of demand that generally follows a logistic curve, satisfies 
(2) and (4). (9) encompasses several particular instances worthy of mention. 
When 0c = , the adjustment of demand follows an exponential path. 
 13
When 1c = , the adjustment of demand follows a hyperbolic tangent, with (9) then written as 
follows: 
( ) ( )0 0 tanh 2l
rtq t q q q ⎛ ⎞= − − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
When 0
0
lq qc
q
−= , demand follows a classic logistic curve and (9) is written as follows: 
( )
0
0
1
l
rtl
qq t
q q e
q
−
= ⎛ ⎞−+ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
We will derive the analytical expression of elasticity ( )tε  corresponding to a reaction from 
demand described by (9). 
First we have: 
0
1 1 1ln
1 1
t rs rt
rs
e c ceds t
ce rc c
− −
−
⎛ ⎞− + += + ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠∫                  (10) 
By combining (9) and (10) we obtain: 
( ) ( )0 0
0
1 1ln
1
t rt
l
c ceq s ds tq q q t
rc c
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ += − − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∫      (11) 
According to (11), (6) gives: 
( ) 0
0
1 11 ln
1
rt
lq qP c cet
p q rct c
ε
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + += +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟Δ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠      (12) 
As according to (1) we have: 0
0
l
l
q qP
p q
ε ⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟Δ ⎝ ⎠ , (12) is written as: 
( ) 1 11 ln
1
rt
l
c cet
rct c
ε ε
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ += +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠      (13) 
Interestingly, (13) provides an analytical expression of elasticity in function of the time 
horizon considered. 
By making parameter c tend towards zero, we find the elasticity corresponding to an 
exponential adjustment of demand ( 0c =  in (9)), since for a small c we have: 
( )1ln 11
rt
rtce c e
c
−
−⎛ ⎞+ ≈ −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
, which gives us: 
( )
0
1lim 1
rt
lc
et
rt
ε ε
−
→
⎛ ⎞−= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Going back to the numerical illustration shown in the main section of the paper, where: 
0 31.2, 0.05, 0.21, 0.2s l
Pq
P
ε ε Δ= = − = − = , let us consider the following three possible paths 
for the reaction of demand (calibrated to these data so as to satisfy (1) and (3)): 
- an exponential adjustment ( )0, 0.57c r= = , 
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- a hyperbolic tangent ( )1, 0.99c r= = , 
- a classic logistic curve ( )0.042, 0.55c r= − = . 
Figure 6 gives the three corresponding elasticity curves, determined according to (13). For the 
first quarter, the average daily increase in stocks is between 220,000 and 245,000 barrels only 
(depending on the reaction of demand considered), while in all scenarios this average daily 
increase amounts to 855,000 barrels over the first year. 
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Figure 6: Elasticity curves corresponding to the reaction functions of demand defined by 
( )0, 0.57c r= = , ( )1, 0.99c r= =  and ( )0.042, 0.55c r= − = . 
 
